The methods of defining and evaluating evolution of information in economic systems are often based on abstract measuretheoretic mean-preserving transformations (MPTs), also known as second-order stochastic dominance. This study first points out that such abstract MPTs have distributional equivalents and then shows that the distributional MPTs often provide analytical settings that are more accessible than those provided by their measure-theoretic analogs. It is shown that a number of abstract results on information value could be readily obtained via the distributional MPTs. The focus is on the central issue of negative value for information.
Introduction
A number of well regarded studies have focused on issues associated with methods of incorporating and evaluating new information about uncertain economic parameters. The foundation for such studies is the seminal work of Blackwell [1] who proposed in an abstract setting various methods for incorporating evolution of information as well as a number of criteria for comparative valuation of information. A crucial result of Blackwell is that the value of information is always nonnegative. The Blackwell methods were first introduced to economic theory by Marschak and Miyasawa [2] , which was then followed by extensive and on-going research as regards how one may incorporate and evaluate information in economic settings.
The stated studies have focused mainly on the presentation of some economic counterexamples to the nonnegativity result of Blackwell and provided some case-specific conditions for the presence or absence of the nonnegativity. In this study we avoid reviewing the extensive literature on this topic and mention only a brief sample that illuminates the background. Hirshleifer [3] discussed the value of private and public information in an exchange economy and raised the possibility of information being harmful to some agents. Green [4] presented a more general framework and developed conditions for nonnegativity of information value in the presence of a futures market. Most recently Campbell [5] has shown that the case of an adverse welfare effect emerging from public information could be rather general.
The existing studies typically construct an abstract model of incorporating and evaluating new information in an economic setting based on Blackwell's measure-theoretic methods. Although there are more presented in those studies, two of the central issues are: (i) how to incorporate the arrival of new information, and (ii) under what conditions new information could have a negative value.
In the following sections we first provide a brief outline of the abstract methods of information evolution and valuation used in the literature and then point out that those evolution methods are in fact measure-theoretic mean-preserving transformations (MPTs) that have intuitive distributional equivalents, also known as second-order stochastic dominance. We then demonstrate in an application our main point that a number results associated with the central issue of negative value for information often obtained through measure-theoretic MPTs could be readily obtained via the distributional MPTs. The significance emerges from the fact that the distributional methods appear to be more efficient than their abstract measure-theoretic analogs, beside being more intuitive as suggested by Rothschild and Stiglitz [6] . Needless to say, the expositions in this study do not detract from the ingenuity and unique advantages associated with the abstract approaches.
Valuation of abstract evolutions
In this section we outline a general formulation of the methods used in the literature and highlight some of their interrelations and results. The uncertainty faced by a decision-maker is generally represented by a lack of full information about a parameter θ , where θ ∈ Ψ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ m }, so Ψ is the set of possible values for θ . Let r = {r 1 , . . . , r m } be the set of prior probabilities (prior beliefs), so the set r of all r i = P(θ = θ i ) forms a probability measure on Ψ . Throughout, it is assumed that Ψ and r are fixed. Let Y = {y 1 , . . . , y n } be a set of n possible observations, Π = {π 1 , . . . , π m } be a set of m probability measures on the set Y . Then the pair (Y, Π ) is an information structure associated with the parameter θ in the following sense. The posterior probabilities (subject to the observation y ∈ Y ) are given by the Bayes rule
and thus for each y ∈ Y , λ y is a probability measure on Ψ . A fundamental question arises as regards how to rank (partially order) different information structures. For this purpose, Blackwell [1] suggested a number of decision-theoretic criteria. Marschak and Miyasawa [2] discussed a general criterion most applicable in economic theory as follows. Suppose the decision-maker has a set A of possible actions to choose from and possesses the von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility function u : Ψ × A → R. As will be elaborated shortly, the expected utility can then be computed subject to the information structure (Y, Π ) using the posterior probabilities stated in (2.1) above. Denote this expected utility by
.2) and in this sense the information (Y , Π ) is an evolution of (Y, Π ).
There is a standard measure-theoretic notion of information structure, namely, a probability space (X, µ, F ). In that context, evolution of information is reflected by a refinement F of the σ -algebra F so F is a sub-σ -algebra of F , F ⊆ F , and the probability measure µ extends to F so
Consistent with intuition, the following connection between the two evolutions in (2.2) and (2.3) has been shown in the literature. If for two information structures (Y, Π ) and (Y , Π ) the ordering in (2.2) holds for some given prior r , then there exist a set X and a probability measure µ on Ψ × X with σ -algebras F and F on X such that F ⊆ F and (2.3) holds [4] . Thus information evolutions in terms of extensions of probability spaces as defined by (2.3) generalize those summarized in (2.2). When the information structure is given by a probability space (X, µ, F ), the posterior probabilities defined in (2.1) become
The value at the given information F can then be defined as in [5] by the expectation
where E S∈F is the expectation with respect to measure µ. It is clear from (2.5) that any additional information reflected by a refinement F of F will generate a value V F not less than V F , thus having a nonnegative value. So, how can any case of negative value for information emerge? It cannot, unless one introduces endogeneity by connecting some of the exogenous parameters that determine the value of information to the information structure. In terms of the valuation model stated in (2.5), the literature has focused on endogenizing the choice set A and/or the utility function u. As will be elaborated shortly, when A and u are exogenously (endogenously) determined, the model essentially describes the valuation methods in a partial equilibrium (general equilibrium). Thus, as stated, a negative value for information cannot emerge in a partial equilibrium. In fact, the studies that have provided cases of negative value for information (e.g., [4, 5] ) are within a setting where the output price is a determinant of value for new information while the price itself is determined endogenously via a general equilibrium or a risk-sharing market that is based on available information.
Viewed from a different angle (e.g., [3] ), the stated exogeneity and partial equilibrium reflect the case where information is privately held while endogeneity and general equilibrium reflect the case where information is publicly disseminated. In the context of (2.5), consider the case where new information is publicly available and the market participants are identical. Then, with the emergence of new information, the posterior probabilities λ S as specified in (2.4) generate implications for the market price ( p), which in turn adjusts the choice set A for each agent. If the uncertainty and evolution of information are in the demand (supply) side, then it is the characteristics of supply (demand) and market structure that partially determine how the price responds in a general equilibrium. One way to incorporate this general equilibrium feature is the following. Let ∆ be the set of all probabilities, including all λ S , and let f : ∆ → A be a set-function where A is the collection of all subsets of A. Thus for each λ S , f (λ S ) is a subset of A. Then the value in (2.5) is replaced by
Now it is easy to see from (2.6) that for any refinement F of F , there is a function f such that F generates a value V F with V F < V F , so the new information has a negative value. Similarly, one can make the utility function u endogenous by defining a function g : ∆ → U, where U is the space of all utility functions, and then replacing the function u in (2.5) or (2.6) by g(λ S ).
The above formulation alluded to some of the main results that have emerged from a number of elaborate models in the literature. Here is a partial summary of those results: (a) A negative value for information cannot emerge in a partial equilibrium setting where prices are fixed. For a negative value to emerge, some form of general equilibrium or risk-sharing that affects prices is required. (b) If uncertainty is held by consumers (producers), then a negative value for information emerges in general equilibrium under certain conditions associated with the supply side (demand side).
Valuation of distributional MPTs
We point out in this section that the abstract methods of information evolution stated above are in fact measuretheoretic mean-preserving transformations (MPTs) that have distributional equivalents. In the following section we show in an application that the distributional MPTs provide a rather intuitive setting where a number of abstract results on information value can be readily obtained.
One aspect of the abstract evolution method elaborated in the last section is that, as information evolves from a partition F to a refinement F , F ⊇ F , the underlying set X remains unchanged and the probability measure µ in the space (X, µ, F ) has an extension µ to F [4] . In the notation of Blackwell ([1], p. 265), this is equivalent to µ ⊇ µ. A crucial observation here is that Blackwell also showed that for two experiments µ and µ on the same observation set X, the condition µ ⊇ µ is in fact equivalent to a mean-preserving transformation of measure µ ([1], Theorems 2 and 3). The terminology is, of course, not surprising since if z is a random variable on the probability space (X, µ, F ), then, since F is a refinement of F , z is F -measurable and
As a probability space identifies a class of random variables and a corresponding class of distributions, the MPTs in terms of probability measures have intuitive equivalents in terms of distributions, which are elaborated in the well-known work of Rothschild and Stiglitz [6] and outlined below. Thus our focus will be on the distributional version of MPTs, keeping in mind as stated that these transformations are in fact versions of the abstract evolutions of information.
To illustrate a version of distributional MPT, consider a producer with the utility u that is a function of profit, where profit is dependent on a random parameter α with the mean m and a choice from the choice set A. A distributional mean-preserving transformation of random parameter α is defined by
where β ∈ [0, 1] and γ = γ (β) are two parameters with the initial (prior) values β = 1 and γ = 0. The evolution of information that reduces risk while maintaining the mean is incorporated by a change dβ ≤ 0 with the meanpreserving property dγ /dβ = −m [6] . In the case of a Gaussian density, such an evolution amounts to a movement of the tails inside without a change in the mean. Under this type of information evolution, it follows from intuition or from the more rigorous results of Gould [7] that
and thus a mean-preserving reduction in risk cannot have a negative value. But, as in the last section, this is a partial equilibrium conclusion in the sense that it assumes exogeneity for the other parameters involved.
Application
In this section we show in an application that the valuation of distributional MPTs in general equilibrium settings can readily highlight the conditions that yield a negative value for information. Let x = α f (l) be the production of a firm with output x and input l where f : R → R is a function with f > 0 and f < 0, and α > 0 is a random productivity parameter with the mean m. The production here may be a CES function that has all but one input fixed and is subject to stochastic productivity. The model can be readily extended to the case of several variable inputs by extending the domain from R to the vector space R n . When the output price is p and the variable input price is w, we may ignore the fixed costs and write the profit function as
and thus the profit in real terms is
where w := w/ p. The firm's utility is given by the function u(π) with u > 0 and u < 0. Consider the arrival of new information that reduces the productivity risk without changing the mean. This arrival is a form of risk-reducing MPT and is incorporated by replacing α with α = βα + γ with the mean-preserving properties stated in the last section. If the firm is operating in a competitive market with a given price p and if the new information is privately available only to the firm, then the result that the information has nonnegative value follows from (3.2), which is restated in the present example as
where β = 1 represents the prior case (β = 1 and γ = 0, so α = α), and β ≤ 1 represents the posterior case (dβ ≤ 0 and dγ /dβ = −m). An advantage of the distributional MPTs is that the stated optimizations in (4.1) lead directly to a number of results useful in identifying the underlying conditions that could generate a negative value, as will be shown next. The maximization of E α [u(π)] over l gives the first-order condition
and the second-order condition requires
which is satisfied by the concavities of f and u. Let l * be the optimal employment of input that emerges as a solution to the first-order condition in (4.2). Next, we replace α in the first-order condition (4.2) with the MPT α = βα + γ . Starting with a differentiation of the resulting first-order condition with respect to β and following a few standard steps that utilize the mean-preserving properties, parallel to the classic results in [8] and [9] , one can easily show that under non-increasing absolute risk aversion
and thus a risk-reducing MPT (dβ < 0) increases the firm's optimal employment and output. The determining factors in this increase are the parameters summarized in (4.3).
As in the abstract approaches of Hirshleifer [3] and Green [4] , extending the valuation process in the present context from the partial equilibrium stated in (4.1) to a general equilibrium involves many possible cases, which are now direct implications of the result in (4.3). We briefly review some of these cases. Suppose the new information is publicly available to all firms, which are assumed to be technologically identical, so all respond according to (4.3) . In simple language, this is equivalent to a rise in the industry supply thus leading to a reduction in the market price, where the extent of the price reduction depends also on the demand and market structure. To incorporate this process, define the posterior price map h : K → M where K := {β : βα + γ is a MPT of α} M := {All values for the output price}.
Since initially β = 1, we have h(1) = p, the prior price. It is clear from the above discussion that dh/dβ ≥ 0, reflecting the fact that a reduction in risk (dβ < 0) increases the aggregate supply via (4.3), thus reducing the market price.
Evidently, the characteristics of the posterior price map h are determined by the parameters summarized in (4.3) as well as the characteristics of the demand and market structure. The prior and posterior values defined in (4.1) can now be extended to a general equilibrium setting through
where, as shown, h is an increasing function of β with h(1) = p, and u is an increasing function of h. It is now clear that for a given posterior β < 1, a sufficiently steep price map h generates V β≤1 < V β=1 , thus generating a negative value for the risk-reducing MPT. The earlier discussion on the function h shows that such a result emerges when the absolute value of the term in (4.3) is sufficiently large or the output demand schedule is sufficiently steep. The following explanation could make the result intuitively more transparent. When all firms incorporate new information that amounts to a lower risk for productivity, the industry supply could increase. The increased supply by the industry reduces the output price to an extent that depends on the market demand conditions. The extent or scale of this price fall may be to the point where each firm ends up worse off in terms of profit and utility than the situation prior to the arrival of new information.
Utilizing distributional MPTs, we have shown that the output demand characteristics could be factors in generating a negative value for productivity information revealed to competitive firms. This result is symmetrical with the existing results derived in abstract evolution contexts stating that certain characteristics of production and costs could be factors in generating a negative value for product information revealed to consumers. The abstract mechanisms that generate such results are essentially the same as the one shown here via the distributional MPTs with rather less abstraction and more intuitive appeal.
